Program

The overall AAMAS Program can be found on the AAMAS Website.

The workshop will be held on May 13th. We will start promptly at 845.

Remember papers already presented have 15 mins including questions and changeover, new papers have 20 mins. Your acceptance notification include the length of time for your presentation, please respect the other participants and stick to it.

• 0845: Welcome and Overview
• 0900 – 1030: Session 1
  • 0900 – 0920: Probably Almost Stable Strategy Profiles in Simulation-Based Games – Mason Wright and Michael Wellman
  • 0920 – 0940: Approximately Maximizing the Broker’s Profit in a Two-sided Market – Jing Chen, Bo Li and Yingkai Li
  • 940 – 1000: Discrete Gift Exchange Game: Effects of Limited Choices on Opponent Interaction – Steven Damer, Maria Gini and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
  • 1000 – 1015: Trembling-Hand Perfection in Stackelberg Sequential Games – Gabriele Farina, Alberto Marchesi, Christian Kroer, Nicola Gatti and Tuomas Sandholm
  • 1015 – 1030: Computing a Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium – Alberto Marchesi, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Nicola Gatti and Tuomas Sandholm
• 1030 – 1100: First Coffee Break
• 1100 – 1235: Session 2
  • 1100 – 1120: Using Stochastic Games for Learning to Control and Stop Optimally in Worst-Case Scenarios – David Mguni
  • 1120 – 1140:Efficient Reinforcement Dynamic Mechanism Design – David Mguni and Marcin Tomczak
  • 1140 – 1200: Decision-Focused Learning of Adversary Behavior in Security Games – Andrew Perrault, Bryan Wilder, Eric Ewing, Aditya Mate, Milind Tambe and Bistra Dilkina
  • 1200 – 1215: Singleton Congestion Games with Leadership – Alberto Marchesi, Stefano Coniglio and Nicola Gatti
  • Applications of Reinforcement Learning in Automated Market-Making – Mohammad Mani and Simon Parsons
  • 12:15: Advertisement Session
• 1235 – 1400: Lunch!
• 1400 – 1530: Session 3
  • 1400 – 1415: Public Good Provision Mechanisms and Reciprocity – Maria Kozlovskaya and Antonio Nicolo
  • 1415 – 1435: The Effects of Single-Player Coalitions on Reward Divisions in Cooperative Games – Greg d’Eon, Kate Larson and Edith Law
  • 1435 – 1455: These Polar Twins: Opinion Dynamics of Intervals – Amr Alhossary, Alan Tsang, Zinovi Rabinovich, Svetlana Obraztsova, Judy Goldsmith and Alex Wyllie
  • 1455 – 1515: Donor Coordination: Collective Distribution of Individual Contributions – Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker and Warut Suksompong
  • 1515 – 1530: IDIL: Exploiting Interdependence to Optimize Multi-Channel Advertising Campaigns – Alessandro Nuara, Nicola Sosio, Francesco Trovò, Maria Chiara Zaccardi, Nicola Gatti and Marcello Restelli
• 1530 – 1600: Second Coffee Break
• 1600 – 1700: Session 4
  • 1600 – 1620: Super Altruistic Hedonic Games – Jacob Schlueter and Judy Goldsmith
  • 1620 – 1640: Strategy Candidacy with Keen Candidates – Jérôme Lang, Evangelos Markakis, Nicolas Maudet, Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov and Zinovi Rabinovich
  • 1640 – 1700:Iterative Voting in District-Based Elections – Tyrone Strangway and Omer Lev
• 1700 – 1800: Panel
  • We will have an interactive panel about Games, Agents, and Incentives for Social Good and Society including the following speakers:
    • Haris Aziz, UNSW and Data61
    • Vincent Conitzer, Duke University
    • Sanmay Das, Washington University in St. Louis
    • John P. Dickerson, University of Maryland
    • Edith Elkind, University of Oxford